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New Challenges for the American Lawyer
in International Human Rights
Susan L. Karamanian*
I Introduction
Every licensed lawyer in the United States takes an oath to support or
uphold the Constitution of the United States and to support or uphold the laws
of the respective state in which he or she is licensed. Every lawyer licensed
to practice in a federal court in the United States similarly swears to uphold
the laws of the United States Constitution. No explicit reference is made to
the obligation of a lawyer to support or uphold international law, let alone the
law of international human rights.
For many practitioners and courts alike, international norms on human
rights are irrelevant, for "it is American conceptions of decency that are dis-
positive."' Domestic lawyers, however, more often are invoking the law of
international human rights in an effort to expand the protection afforded their
clients' civil, criminal, social, political, and economic rights. At times, they
succeed. Indeed, courts have entered substantial monetary judgments based
on violations of the law of nations2 or based on violations of federal statutes
* Shareholder, LockePumell Rain Harrell (AProfessional Corporation), Dallas, Texas.
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1. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,369 n.1 (1989). In concluding that the Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit the State from executing a person who was ajuvenile at the time
of the offense, Justice Scalia rejected as irrelevant to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that
three treaties, one of which the United States had ratified, explicitly prohibit the death penalty
forjuveniles. See id at 389-90 & n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 668-70 (1993) (concluding that forcible abduction did not
violate United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty even though abduction may violate general
international law principles); Jack H. Backman, A USException on UNRights, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 8, 1997, at A15 ("No case involving enforcement of the Universal Declaration [of Human
Rights] has gone before the U.S. Supreme Court and general legal opinion is that unless it is
enacted into U.S. law, it is not enforceable in U.S. courts.").
2. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate ofMarcos, 103 F.3d 789,791 (9th Cir. 1996) (observing that
district court entered $750 million judgment in favor of plaintiff class in case brought under
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994) (originally enacted as Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77)); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 197-202 (D. Mass. 1995)
(entering multi-million dollar default judgment against Guatemalan Minister of Defense for,
among other things, violating the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994))). For
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that implicate international human rights principles
Despite the apparent interest ofsomejudges4 and the deliberate efforts of
international human rights lawyers, acceptance of the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement in The Paquete Habana5 that "[i]nternational law is part of our
law"6 still is not widespread. Further, even though certain domestic courts'
application of international law and comparative constitutional law norms "is
a step forward," little assurance can be hadthatthese courts' decisions comport
with the decisions of other tribunals, particularly those that focus on human
rights, such as United Nations treaty bodies or regional human rights treaty
bodies, and vice versa.7 The likelihood of inconsistency is magnified given
that, at any moment numerous United States courts may be reviewing cases
that involve what even legal scholars admit is an evolving concept
insight into how certain United States courts determine what conduct violates international
human rights law, see generally Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (1 th Cir. 1996); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996); Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos (In re Estate ofFerdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1474-75 (9th
Cir. 1994); and Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
3. See Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998) (entering
default judgment of more than $250 million against Iran and various Iranian officials for state-
sponsored terrorism for violations of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 (West
Supp. 1998))).
4. The 1996 Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit devoted a full session to international human rights. The speakers included two of the
field's most preeminent scholars, Professor Louis Henkin and Professor Harold Koh, leading
activists from the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch/Asia, and
a prosecutor from the War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague. The proceedings are at Judicial
Conference, Second Judicial Circuit of the United States, 170 F.R.D. 201, 274-318 (1996)
[hereinafter Judicial Conference].
5. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
6. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The Supreme Court found that the
capture of two Cuban fishing vessels by the United States was unlawful and without probable
cause. Id.
7. See Richard B. Lillich, HarmonizingHuman Rights Law Nationally and Internation-
ally: The Death Row Phenomenon as a Case Study, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 699, 701 & n.11
(1996) (describing concern about "normative consistency" expressed by Judge Rosalyn Higgins
of International Court of Justice and by Professor Philip Alston, independent expert for United
Nations, that inconsistency and confusion likely will grow as standards proliferate and new
treaty bodies are created).
8. See, e.g., ROSALYNHIGGINS, PROBLEMS &PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAw AND How
WE USE IT 104 (1994) ("IT]he articulation of claims as human rights is part of the process of
according priority to decision-making processes."); Louis Henkin, Evolving Concepts of
International Human Rights Law and the Current Consensus, in 170 F.R.D. 275, 276 (1997).
As an example of inconsistency within United States courts, compare Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that federal court has jurisdiction over alien's claim
for violations of law of nations), with Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) ("[I]t is essential that there be an explicit grant of a cause
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Within this fragile environment works a unique group of professionals,
the lawyers. As the gatekeepers of justice,9 lawyers play an essential role.
Lawyers, with specialized training and skills, have a license that enables them
to appear in court to protect and promote rights. The rights at issue here are
those that each individual has against the state because of his or her status as
a human being. They are human rights. These rights have become of para-
mount importance during this century, in large part due to the deliberate
efforts of lawyers, namely, international law professors, attorneys for various
international human rights groups, and interested private practitioners. One
international lawyer poignantly summarized the role of these lawyers: "It is
somewhat paradoxical that the once-impregnable walls of the sovereign State,
so carefully constructed by thejurists of the nineteenth century, are now being
dismantled by the innovative and ingenious techniques of the jurists of the
twentieth century."'"
This paper discusses the future role of the lawyer in international human
rights. Its framework is based on Professor Anthony Kronman's observation
in The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession that the lawyer
must be more than a professional who has the "legal know-how."" The lawyer
in international human rights plays a highly public function. First and fore-
most, the lawyer must be devoted to the public good as defined by existing or
emerging universally-accepted international norms.'2 To paraphrase Professor
Henkin, we lawyers must accept international human rights for ourselves.'3
This devotion means that the international human rights lawyer must
continue to invoke universal norms in assuming the traditional and indispens-
able role as an advocate on behalf of a specific client in a specific dispute. He
of action before a private plaintiff be allowed to enforce principles of international law in a
federal tribunal.").
9. For example, paragraph 1 of"Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities" to the Texas
Disciplinary Rules ofProfessional Conduct states: "[A lawyer is a] public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality ofjustice. Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the
preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of
their relationship with and function in our legal system." TEx. GoV'TCODEANN. tit. 2, subpart
G, app. A; art. 10, § 9 (West Supp. 1998). Similarly, the American Bar Association has
recommended that each local bar association adopt "A Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism" that
recognizes that a lawyer has "a devotion to the public good."
10. Symposium, The Legal Profession and Human Rights: International Human Rights
and Sovereignty of States: Role and Responsibility ofLawyers, 21 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 541,
546-47 (1997) (remarks of Fali Nariman, President, Bar Association of India; Chairman,
International Commission of Jurists).
11. ANmTHoNYT.KRoNMAN, THELOSTLAWYER: FAILING IDEALS oFTHELEGALPROFES-
SION 15 (1993).
12. See id. at 14 (stating that "the outstanding lawyer... is, to begin with, a devoted
citizen").
13. SeeLouisHenkinRights: American andHuman, 79 COLUM.L.REv. 405,421(1979).
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or she should, however, do more or at least encourage other lawyers to do
more. The lawyer must link international human rights law with the public
good and exalt the cause of the public good. The lawyer should educate other
lawyers, judges, and lay persons about internationally-accepted norms and
urge them to use these norms in guiding these persons in their conduct and
decisions. Citizens, clients, and government and nongovernment agencies
should look to the international human rights lawyer for guidance and advice
on the subject. In addition, the lawyer should work with other lawyers from
around the world in documenting human rights abuses and monitoring en-
forcement in domestic and regional tribunals and in insisting that his own
federal government submit to international scrutiny.
In sum, the lawyer should be "a public-spirited reformer who monitors
[the] framework [of public norms] itself and leads others in campaigning for
those repairs that are required to keep it responsive and fair." 4 Absent a
broad-based, activist approach, domestic efforts to enforce universally-recog-
nized rights will continue to suffer from an apparent "crisis of legitimacy.'
5
I. The American Lawyer in International Human Rights:
A Brief Overview
Lawyers who promote or defend international human rights already serve
a public good, one that is defined on behalf of individuals and in terms of
internationally-accepted norms. While the public good aspect may be self-
evident, a brief review should reaffirm and provide a theoretical basis for this
conclusion.
A. International Law and the Public Good
As Professor Henkin remarks, "international non-conventional human
rights law isjus cogens, or is likejus cogens.'"'6 Jus cogens, in turn, reflects
"common consensus from which few dare dissent." 7 Some federal courts
14. KRONMAN, supra note 11, at 19. In Dean Kronman's view, these qualities are
elements of a "statesman," and those lawyers who possess them and certain other qualities,
particularly a proper sense ofjudgment, fit within the nineteenth century ideal of the "lawyer-
statesman." Id. at 11-17. For various reasons, I prefer not to equate the "lawyer-statesman"
model with the ideal international human rights lawyer, although I agree, as set forth in this
paper, that certain attributes of that ideal are essential for the lawyer who seeks to promote or
defend international human rights.
15. See Dorothy Q. Thomas, Advancing Rights Protection in the United States: An
Internationalized Advocacy Strategy, 9 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 15, 24 (1996).
16. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
31, 38 & n.28 (1996) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. n (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]).
17. Id. at 38. In a similar vein, the International Court of Justice has written that these
norms, which include "principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person,"
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have recognized in human rights cases thatjus cogens means, as the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties said, "a norm accepted and recognized by
the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted." 8
Jus cogens norms reflect the international community's fundamental
values; they are not based on the consent of states. 9 They are so fundamental
that they prevail over and invalidate international agreements and other rules
of international law that conflict with them.2" They can be modified or dero-
gated only by a subsequentjus cogens norm.2' Norms ofjus cogens by defini-
tion reflect the public good.
Customary international law that does not rise to the esteem level ofjus
cogens, nevertheless, also is founded on principles of the public good. Cus-
tomary international law arises from "a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."' It is "international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."' In ascertaining
and administering customary international law, courts resort "to the customs
and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of
jurists and commentators."24 International law is to be interpreted as it has
evolved and as it exists among the nations of the world today.'
are the concern of all states; "they are obligations erga omnes." Barcelona Traction, Light &
Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5).
18. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992)
(citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332,
8 I.L.M. 679), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993); Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v.
Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same); National Coalition Gov't of Burma v.
UNOCAL, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345 n.18 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (same).
19. David F. Klein, A Theoryfor the Application of the Customary International Law of
Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332, 351 (1988).
20. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TiE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 cmt. k (1987).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 102(2).
23. Statute of International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans
1179, 1187 (1945).
24. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1990)). Furthermore,
jurists and commentators... by years of labor, research and experience have made
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such
works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors
concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law
really is.
Id. at 880-81 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700).
25. Id at 881.
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Prime evidence of the customs and usages of civilized nations are human
rights treaties and resolutions.26 Foremost among these are the UnitedNations
Charter 7 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.28 The
Charter, which "heralded also the birth of international human rights,"29 and
which in large part was written by lawyers, provides in article 1, paragraph 3
that the United Nations is "[t]o achieve international cooperation ... in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all."30 Article 55(c) provides for "universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all."31 The Uni-
versal Declaration is "the first comprehensive statement enumerating the basic
rights of the individual to be promulgated by a universal international organi-
zation."32 It proclaims, among other things, that all human beings (1) "are
born free and equal in dignity and rights;"33 (2) have civil and political rights,
including the right to life, liberty, and security of person, the prohibition
against slavery, torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the right
to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the right to privacy,
freedom of speech, religion, and assembly;3" and (3) have economic, social,
and cultural rights, including the right to work and to an education.3
Federal courts frequently cite both the U.N. Charter and the Universal
Declaration in defining the law of nations.36 They also have cited the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights,37 the International Covenant on Civil and
26. See Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution andInternational Human Rights, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 851, 857 (1989).
27. U.N. CHARTER, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 10.1
(Richard B. Lillich ed., 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter INSTRUMENTS].
28. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
29. Henkin, supra note 16, at 34.
30. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3), reprinted in INSTRUMENTS, supra note 27, at 10.2.
31. Id. art. 55(c), reprinted in INSTRUMENTS, supra note 27, at 10.5. Article 56 provides
that Member States "pledge themselves.to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Id. art. 56, reprinted
in INSTRUMENTS, supra note 27, at 10.5.
32. Thomas Buergenthal, InternationalHuman Rights Law andInstitutions: Accomplish-
ments andProspects, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1988). Professor Buergenthal also notes that the
Universal Declaration "ranks with the Magna Carta, the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man, and the American Declaration of Independence as a milestone in mankind's struggle for
freedom and human dignity." Id.; see Henkin, supra note 16, at 40 n.31 (stating that Universal
Declaration "is perhaps the most important document, excepting only the U.N. Charter").
33. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 28, art. 1.
34. Id. arts. 3-5, 9, 12, 18-20.
35. Id. arts. 23, 26.
36. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 879-83 (2d Cir. 1980).
37. American Convention on Human Rights, openedfor signature Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE AMERICAN LA WYER
Political Rights,38 the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms,39 and the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishmenta0 for the conclusion
that the prohibition against official torture is a norm of customary interna-
tional law.4 Federal courts have adopted a similar analysis of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 2 for the proposi-
tion that "the proscription of genocide has applied equally to state and non-
state actors."43 Indeed, "through their repeated reference to the Charter and
the Universal Declaration" and other conventions, courts in the United States
and abroad have contributed "to the incremental formation of a practice that
has now ripened into customary law of international human rights."'
B. Lawyers Promoting the Public Good
Lawyers who represent clients before tribunals seeking relief for viola-
tions of customary international law, or who otherwise participate in support
of amidi curiae or as expert witnesses, are promoting the public good. The
same holds true for lawyers who prudently urge the tribunal to follow interna-
tional human rights law in construing the Constitution or statutes of the
United States. Lawyers seek to enforce established norms that reflect funda-
mental values of the international community in each of these instances.
Without enforcement of these universally-recognized rights, the law of human
rights merely would be a set of principles without much consequence.45
U.N.T.S. 144 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
38. International CovenantonCivil andPoliticalRights, Dec. 19,1966,999U.N.T.S. 171.
39. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, Council of Europe, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
40. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027.
41. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,716-17 (9th Cir. 1992).
42. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, openedfor
signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, for the United States
Feb. 23, 1989).
43. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524
(1996).
44. Francesco Francioni, An International Bill ofRights: Why It Matters, How It Can Be
Used, 32 TEx. INT'L L.J. 471,474 & n.21 (1997) (citing Louis B. Sohn, The New International
Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12
(1982)).
45. Jerome J. Shestack, Immediate Past President of the American Bar Association and
former Ambassador to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, has noted, "In a
democratic system wherejudicial independence prevails, enforcement of legal rules through the
courts is the principal safeguard of human rights in the international arena." Jerome J. Shestack,
The Legal Profession and Human Rights: Globalization ofiHuman Rights Law, 21 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 558, 564 (1997).
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The seminal case in the United States federal courts, Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala,46 exemplifies this point. In Filartiga, the plaintiffs, two citizens of
Paraguay, sued a Paraguayan official for torturing their son/brother.47 They
alleged jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act,48 which provides that
"[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States."49 The plaintiffs claimed that torture violated the "law
of nations," or established norms of the international law of human rights.5"
The district court dismissed the case because the "law of nations" did not
concern acts of a Paraguayan official against another Paraguayan citizen.5 In
reversing the district court's dismissal, the Second Circuit analyzed various
sources of customary international law52 and concluded that "official torture
is now prohibited by the law of nations. The prohibition is clear and unambig-
uous, and admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens and citizens."53
Judge Kaufman, writing for the panel, also noted that "international law
confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own governments.
While Judge Kaufman's detailed examination of the sources of interna-
tional law and the conclusions he reached based on his examination have
proven to be of lasting importance, his concluding paragraph of the opinion
is equally compelling. In particular, Judge Kaufman noted that after World
War II, civilized nations "banded together to prescribe acceptable norms of
international behavior ... to recognize that respect for fundamental human
rights is in their individual and collective interest."55 The torturer, like the
pirate and slave trader before him, had become "hostis humani generis, an
enemy of all mankind.,
56
46. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
47. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
48. Id. at 879.
49. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
50. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879.
51. Id. at 880.
52. Id. at 881-84 (discussing United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration, Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975), American Convention on Human Rights,
opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144 (entered into force July 18, 1978),
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, and
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
Council of Europe, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (semble)).
53. Id. at 884.
54. Id. at 885.
55. Id. at 890 (emphasis added).
56. Id.
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Filartiga opened the doors of the United States courthouses to other alien
tort claims based on violations of the "law of nations." After Filartiga,
federal courts have concluded that torture, murder, genocide, and slavery
violate jus cogens norms of the international community." Those who
commit these intolerable, inhumane acts are now recognized as the "enemy of
all mankind."
Lawyers are indispensable tojudicial enforcement of international human
rights. In claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act, for example, American
lawyers have served as counsel to various foreign plaintiffs. Many of the
plaintiffs' attorneys are affiliated with groups such as the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights and International Human Rights Clinic, which are committed to
promoting international human rights. Lawyers also have served as counsel
for amici curiae, including leading nongovernmental human rights organiza-
tions such as Amnesty International, the International League for Human
Rights, the Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights, the Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Groups, and Human Rights Watch. These groups
have been at the forefront of the legal effort to implement human rights
standards and "in marshaling public opinion against human rights abuses."58
Not to be forgotten are the lawyers for the United States government. In
Filartiga, then-Assistant Attorney General Drew Days submitted an amicus
curiae brief on behalf of the United States that confirmed "the universal
abhorrence with which torture is viewed."59 Kadic v. Karadzic" involved
claims of torture, summary execution, acts of genocide, and war crimes under
the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
against Radovan Karadzic, the self-proclaimed president of an unrecognized
Bosnian-Serb entity.61 The Legal Adviser to the United States Department of
State and the United States Solicitor General submitted a "Statement of
Interest" that "expressly disclaimed any concern that the political question
doctrine should be invoked to prevent the litigation of these lawsuits.""2
Lawyers are also involved as expert witnesses in defining the law of
nations. 3 In Filartiga for example, four distinguished international legal
scholars submitted affidavits that "the law of nations prohibits absolutely the
57. See United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).
58. See, e.g., Shestack, supra note45, at 561 (discussing specifically role of International
League for Human Rights, International Commission of Jurists, and Amnesty International).
59. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing and quoting from
Memorandum of United States as Amicus Curiae).
60. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
61. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524
(1996).
62. Id. at 250.
63. See supra note 24 (citing Filartiga).
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use of torture."' Law professors also play an important role to the extent that,
in determining international law, courts refer to their learned treatises and
books. We also should be mindful that some lawyers are judges. Federal
judges are enforcing universally-accepted human rights in cases in which a
federal statute, such as the Alien Tort Claims Act, prescribes application of
the "law of nations." Certain judges look more frequently to international
human rights law in analyzing what may appear to be routine domestic dis-
putes. In other words, they are incorporating international human rights law
into United States constitutional and statutory standards.
In Alabama v. Engler65 for example, the Sixth Circuit concluded that it
was required under the Constitution to extradite an inmate from Michigan to
Alabama, even though Alabama uses the chain gang and one of its state
senators recently had declared that slavery was "good for blacks."66 Judge
Jones commented that "I only wish, however, that penal institutions will soon
shed rather than irrationally embrace socially vindictive policies and proce-
dures soundly condemned as violations of international human rights
norms." '67 Another example may be found in Lipscomb v. Simmons" in which
the court struck down as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment Oregon's
practice of declaring that foster children who lived with relatives were ineligi-
ble to receive state funds because it denied the children the right to choose to
live with family members.69 The court stated that the right to associate with
family members is fundamental, citing the Universal Declaration, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American Convention on
Human Rights.7" In a habeas case, Caballero v. Caplinger,7' a federal district
court held that a federal statute allowing indefinite detention of an alien
without the opportunity to have a bond hearing violated the Eighth Amend-
64. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879 & n.4 (referring to affidavits of Richard Falk, Albert G.
Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton University and former Vice
President of American Society of International Law; Thomas M. Franck, Professor of Interna-
tional Law at New York University, Director of New York University Center for International
Studies, and current President of American Society of International Law; Richard Lillich,
Howard W. Smith Professor of Law at University of Virginia School of Law; and Myres
MacDougal, Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law School and past President of American
Society of International Law).
65. 85 F.3d 1205 (6th Cir. 1996).
66. Alabama v. Engler, 85 F.3d 1205, 1210 (6th Cir. 1996) (Jones, J., concurring).
67. Id. (Jones, J., concurring).
68. 884 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1989).
69. Lipscomb v. Simmons, 884 F.2d 1242, 1248-50 (9th Cir. 1989).
70. Id. at 1244 n.1.
71. 914 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. La. 1996).
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ment.7 In support, Judge Berrigan cited the United Nations Charter, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and various conventions as represent-
ing "the collective consciousness of the international community, creating a
hope if not an expectation of adherence."'7
1II. Toward a Broader, More Activist Approach for the American Lawyer
in Recognizing and Enforcing International Human Rights
All lawyers are acting in the public good in promoting and defending
international human rights. As a result of their work, certain United States
courts have risen above the shield of sovereignty and have applied interna-
tional law in recognizing specific universal human rights and in imposing
remedies for violations of these human rights. 4 But few United States courts
have done so. Furthermore, the "well-established, universally recognized
norms of international law" that have received judicial acknowledgment are
few in number.
Lawyers need to continue to do what they do best in promoting the rule
of law; in other words, they should be advocates. They must, however,
expand and intensify their efforts on all fronts, and this means going beyond
judicial tribunals. Furthermore, they need to become more organized, method-
ical, and efficient in the process.
A. Organizing and Educating Lawyers
In a recent law review article, two economists argue very persuasively
that changes in the law occur, in part, not because of judges' preferences or
even because of the preference of the litigants, but because of the preferences
of lawyers.75 The law will "come to favor organized interest groups."76 When
72. Caballero v. Caplinger, 914 F. Supp. 1374, 1380 (E.D. La. 1996).
73. Id. at 1379. ProfessorLillich has observedthat"[t]his'indirect incorporation' of both
conventional and customary international human rights law is an exceptionally promising
approach warranting even great attention and increased use in the future." Lillich, supra note
26, at 859-60. He also noted that this approach is not new; 40 years ago, Professor Schacter
stated that "[i]t would be unrealistic to ignore the influence ... of the Charter as a factor in
resolving constitutional issues which hitherto have been in doubt." Id. at 860 n.48 (quoting
Oscar Schacter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provisions in American
Law, 4 VAND. L. REV. 643, 658 (1951)).
74. See supra notes 36-73 and accompanying text (describing Filartiga and other cases
citing international law sources). Butsee Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,805
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, L, concurring) (stating that it would violate separation of powers for
plaintiff to have standing to sue for violation of international law).
75. See generally Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role ofLawyers in Changing
the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807 (1994).
76. Id. at 825.
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no other organized parties with strong interests rise to the front in a specific
matter, the law should tend to favor the interests of the lawyers.7 7
Organized bar associations and other collections of lawyers, whether they
be international, national, or regional in scope, either are, or have the potential
to be, powerful interest groups. Indeed, it was nongovernmental human rights
organizations, such as the International Commission of Jurists, a group of
lawyers and judges "with a mission to develop the rule of law in the human
rights area" that led the charge against human rights abuses.78 During the mid-
and late- 1970s, the International Bar Association, the American Bar Associa-
tion, and the Union of Advocates "started to endorse human rights treaties and
monitor human rights abuses and send observers to trials of human rights
advocates."79 The Lawyers Committee "report[ed] on and help[ed] redress
human rights abuses."8 These organizations have "become a significant non-
governmental force" because they have access to lawyers, as a whole, and to
government leaders.81
But as one observer properly notes, "[t]he struggle to secure fundamental
human rights is ultimately a local struggle." 2 All of the work of international
and national bar associations could be for naught if lawyers at the local level
are not involved. State bar associations, and possibly county bar associations,
should have sections that at least address international human rights issues.
Law schools also should hold classes and conduct seminars on the subject and
offer practitioners continuing legal education on international human rights.
Finding interested lawyers at the local level should not be too difficult.
In particular, criminal defense attorneys would be a good starting point. For
example, a federal statute enacted within the last fifteen years permits pretrial
seizure of an accused's assets when those assets are proven to be the product
of criminal activity. 3 The federal government has applied this statute to seize
defense attorney's fees. 4 An argument could be made, however, that the fee
seizure statute violates international human rights law because it effectively
deprives the defendant of the benefits of the presumption of innocence.85
77. Id.
78. Shestack, supra note 45, at 561.
79. Id. at 562.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 562-63.
82. Thomas, supra note 15, at 16.
83. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1994).
84. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607 (1989).
85. See Richard J. Wilson, Using International Human Rights Law and Machinery in
Defending Borderless Crime Cases, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1606, 1610-14 (1997) (citing
Universal Declaration and various other international conventions and declarations, including
Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers adopted by Eighth United Nations Congress on the
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Similarly, for those criminal defense attorneys who work in one of the thirty-
eight states in the United States that imposes capital punishment, an under-
standing of the role of various international conventions and declarations and
of the opportunity to file claims before regional tribunals, such as the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, is becoming more important now
that state and federal habeas review processes are being streamlined. 6
The evolving law of international human rights also is relevant to the
work of many private civil attorneys. For example, in National Coalition
Government of Burma v. Unocal,8" the plaintiffs alleged that Unocal was
liable under the Alien Tort Claims Act for alleged human rights abuses
occurring at a gas pipeline project in Burma.88 Unocal moved to dismiss on
the grounds that it was not a state actor as required for liability under the
Alien Tort Claims Act.89 The court held that plaintiffs' pleading of a joint
venture relationship between Burma and Unocal was sufficientto state a claim
because "Unocal may have been 'a willful participant in joint action with the
State or its agents."'90 IfUnocal ultimately is held liable under ajoint-venture
theory, no doubt more plaintiffs' attorneys will be looking for creative ways
to sue solvent multinational corporations for international human rights
abuses.9
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (United Nations, Report of the Eighth
UnitedNations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana,
Cuba, 27 August-September 1990, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28 (Oct. 5,1990)), which provides
in article 16 that "Governments shall ensure that lawyers... shall not suffer, or be threatened
with, prosecution or administrative, economic or other sanctions for any action taken in
accordance with recognized professional duties, standards and ethics.").
86. See id. at 1614-20. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, ABOLITION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1997).
87. 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
88. National Coalition Gov't of Burma v. Unocal, 176 F.R.D. 329, 334-35 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
89. Id. at 335.
90. Id at 348 (quoting Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989)).
91. But see Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 384 (E.D. La. 1997)
(dismissing plaintiffs claims for cultural genocide, human rights violations, and international
environmental torts). In Beanal, an Indonesian citizen filed a class action lawsuit against
Freeport-McMoRan and a related entity under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim
Protection Act. Id at 366. Plaintiff alleged that Freeport violated the law of nations, namely
that it engaged in environmental torts, human rights abuses, and cultural genocide. Id. The
claims arose from Freeport's operation of an open pit copper, gold, and silver mine in Irian
Jaya, Indonesia. Id. Plaintiff alleged that Freeport's security guards "in conjunction with third
parties" engaged in arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, surveillance, and destruction of
property that caused severe physical pain and suffering. Id. at 369. Plaintiff also alleged that
Freeport engaged in "cultural genocide" through the "deliberate, contrived and planned cultural
demise of the Amungme culture," of which plaintiff is a member. Id. The district court
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Federal judges also should receive training in the law of international
human rights. The session at the 1996 Judicial Conference of the Second
Circuit devoted to international human rights' was enlightening as evidenced
by the follow-up questions and comments.93 A similar session for judges in
all of the other ten federal circuits could perhaps make the federal judiciary
"familiar with the law of nations," so that they may feel more "comfortable
navigating by it."'94
B. Educating the Public
Lawyers should educate the general public about universal human rights
norms as part of their civic obligations. They should express concern when
human rights are violated and not be deterred if their statements possibly
could be construed to interfere improperly with the affairs of the State.95 They
should advise the public about the need for the United States to subject itself
dismissed the complaint without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id.
at 384. It first concluded that, under Kadic, certain of the alleged acts violated the law of
nations, regardless of whether they were committed by a state or private actor (for example,
genocide), whereas other conduct violated the law of nations only if committed by a state actor
(for example, murder and torture). Id. at 371. The district court found that plaintiff had not
pleaded genocide because it did not plead that Freeport committed acts with the intentto destroy
the Amungme group, as opposed to its culture. Id. at 372-73. The court also dismissed the
claims requiring state conduct on the grounds that plaintiff had not pleaded that Freeport acted
under color of state law. 1d. at 374, 380. Moreover, it dismissed plaintiff's claim under the
Torture Victim Protection Act on the grounds that that statute does not apply to a corporation.
Id. at 381-82. Finally, the court ruled that plaintiff's international environmental torts claims
"do not constitute international torts for which there is universal consensus in the international
community as to their binding status and their content." ld. at384. After the original dismissal,
plaintiff filed two other amended complaints, both of which were dismissed and the latter of
which was dismissed with prejudice. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., Civ. No. 96-1474
(E.D. La. Mar. 3, 1998). The case is on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.
92. See supra note 4 (describing conference).
93. Judicial Conference, supra note 4, 170 F.R.D. at312-14. For example, Judge Jacobs
asked whether if Canada enacted a law comparable to the Alien Tort Claims Act, ajudgment
could be entered and enforced against the Governor of Texas for violating international norms,
including torture, for holding prisoners on Texas's death row. Id. at 312. Judge Laval asked
if state actors who participate in the death process could be held accountable if an international
criminal tribunal is ever established that would have jurisdiction over all crimes against
humanity. Id. at 314.
94. Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39,
49 (1994) (observing that Supreme Court "enforces some principles of international law and
some of its obligations some of the time" and reasoning that it appears this is so because of
Court's concern about separation ofpowers andjudicial competence and because modernjurists
lack diplomatic experience of early Justices).
95. See Hans Corell, The United Nations and the Legal Community in Promotion of
Human Rights, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 519, 524 (1997).
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to monitoring so that it could "be said to truly follow the ideas of the protec-
tion of human rights and can also speak with much more legitimacy when [it]
address[es] human rights concerns or violations in other States."9 As one
United Nations official remarks:
Irrespective ofwvherewe serve inthe legal community, however, we all have
a special responsibility to advance human rights. We are privileged be-
cause we have had the opportunity of studying the role of human rights in
society under the rule of law. We have an obligation to share this knowl-
edge with others. For a genuine observation of human rights, it is impor-
tant that this knowledge also be spread to the grass roots.97
C. Litigation
When appropriate, lawyers should continue to assert claims based on
international human rights norms. As the Filartiga court recognized, stan-
dards of international law are "evolving," and the courts should apply the
international law in effect when the issue is raised.98 Thus, the lawyer needs
to keep abreast of all of the new developments from whatever possible
sources, including new conventions, declarations, and cases.
Lawyers should act deliberately in identifying those norms that are
sufficiently specific, universal, and obligatory to meet the test of Filartiga.
For example, the Ninth Circuit in Hilao v. Estate ofMarcos9 held that while
"cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment" is a universally-recognized norm
under international law, it is not sufficiently specific to allow a claim for its
violation under the Alien Tort Claims Act."° But the district court inXuncax
v. Gramajo'0' found that torture, ransacking of homes, and bombings qualify
as specific examples of "cruel, inhuman or degrading" activity in violation of
international law.' Clearly, over the next few years, parties will litigate the
scope of "cruel, inhuman or degrading."' 3
96. Id. at 525.
97. Id. at 528-29.
98. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (citing Filartiga).
99. 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996).
100. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 795 (9th Cir. 1996).
101. 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
102. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D. Mass. 1995).
103. Another example of the area in which more litigation is likely is "international
environmental torts." See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362,383 (E.D. La.
1997) (discussing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 CIV. 7527 (VLB), 1994 WL 142006
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668,670 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); I PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FRAMEWORKS, STANDARDS
AND IMPLEMENTATION 183-86 (Philipe Sands ed., 1995)).
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Further, lawyers should be mindful of the Torture Victim Protection Act,
which now provides a federal cause of action for official torture and extrajudi-
cial killing.'4 But they should also realize that the Torture Victim Protection
Act requires a showing that the individuals who have committed torture or
extrajudicial killing must have acted "under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation."' 5
It is likely that Congress will enact new laws that require courts to exam-
ine international human rights principles. For example, the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 199606 may prompt important decisions on
issues such as exemption from the sovereign immunity doctrine and state-
sponsored terrorism.
At all times, though, the lawyer should examine each case from the per-
spective of relevant international human rights principles and, when appro-
priate, attempt to incorporate those principles into the analysis. As the late
Professor Lillich wrote, using the "' indirect incorporation' approach seems to
be a sensible strategy for human rights lawyers and a wise policy for U.S.
courts concerned with developing the promising relationship between the U.S.
Constitution and international human rights law.'
10 7
IV. Conclusion
Professor Kronman reminds us that lawyers should aspire to serve the
public good, to be devoted citizens committed to the spirit of the law. As such,
we must be advocates for international human rights. And we must do more.
Onthe day JusticeBlackmun announced his retirementfrom the Supreme
Court, hejust happened to be giving the keynote address at the Annual Meeting
of the American Society of International Law. That day also coincided with
Professor Henkin's retirement as President of the Society. Justice Blackmun's
concluding statement was a simple reminder to everyone of the work that
remains: "I look forward to the day when the majority of the Supreme Court
will inform almost all of its decisions almost all of the time with a decent
respect to the opinions of mankind."'0 8 For that day to ever come, we as
lawyers must assume our solemn responsibilities on behalf of all of mankind.
104. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing claims in Kadic).
105. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Torture Victim Protec-
tion Act of 1991 § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note
(1994))), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2524 (1996).
106. See supra note 3 (discussing case finding violation of Act).
107. Lillich, supra note 26, at 860 (footnote omitted).
108. Blackmun, supra note 94, at 49.
